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350 Faith and Philosophy 
sible that there exists a being morally better than it. (91) But the consequent 
entails that the omniscient being is not essentially perfectly good. And Rowe 
contends that the principle expresses a necessary truth. These modifications 
facilitate presentation of Rowe's argument. 
2. Well, strictly he would have to give up (OA:J A) or (A:J OA). But it is 
hard to imagine anyone contending that some actual states of affairs are also 
impossible. 
Science and the Study of God: A Mutuality Model for Theology and Science, by 
Alan G. Padgett. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. Pp. 224. $22.00 (paper). 
Divine Action and Modern Science, by Nicholas Saunders. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002. Pp. 234. $22.00 (paper). 
PATRICK RICHMOND, St Catharine's College, Cambridge, UK 
These two books deal with the relation of science to theology, one concentrat-
ing more on broad outlines and methodology, the other on a specific topic. 
Both take Christian faith as a given, at least provisionally, and both note that 
Christian faith sees science as investigating God's creation, so science and 
theology are both concerned with understanding the same cosmos. 
Proceeding from this basic perspective, Padgett develops a collegial 
metaphor of mutuality, sketching what he terms" dialectical realism" be-
tween science and theology. Science and theology should both inform and 
be informed by our worldview, our basic framework for life that helps 
us understand the world and motivates our practice as well. Our world-
view can affect the way we interpret the data and conclusions of academic 
disciplines. This "mutuality model" sees science and theology as more 
intimately related than mere dialogue partners but as still distinct and not 
fully integrated academic disciplines. 
Padgett points out that many claims that science and religion are in-
compatible incorrectly assume that science is a world view or that it pre-
supposes a naturalistic worldview. In fact, science arose from a Christian 
intellectual environment: even Galileo was not antireligious. 
Padgett argues for the existence of various levels of explanation, with 
disciplines like history using explanations that presuppose those used in 
the social and physical sciences. Theology likewise includes explanatory 
claims, such as that God somehow explains the existence of the cosmos. 
He argues that in the right circumstances one's worldview, including reli-
gious commitments, can rationally help one choose among various theo-
ries that are equally supported by the data and standards of other disci-
plines. Although the truth must be sought in each science according to the 
traditions of enquiry of that discipline, results in one field may be called 
into question by those in another if they do not cohere, as indeed happens 
amongst the sciences from time to time. 
Next, Padgett argues for "dialectical realism." We learn in a community 
with a history and tradition. As with many post-modem approaches, there 
is a suspicion of grand systems and an attention to the particular and excep-
tional. Padgett also argues for critical realism in both theology and science. 
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The subject of both is held to exist independently of the investigator's ex-
perience of them. This is the viewpoint of almost all religious believers and 
Padgett defends it against the claims of Heidegger and others. Theological 
language is metaphorical and analogical and its theories should be modest, 
dialectical and open to revision, but theology is not impossible. 
In the third chapter Padgett argues that there is no neutral, value free 
study of religion. He complains that many authors of recent works on 
the historical Jesus have attempted to write histories about Jesus reject-
ing religious faith while being blind to their own metaphysical presup-
positions. Even when they recognize the role of presuppositions, many 
authors attempt to be scientific or objective and then ignore them again, 
or appeal to scholarly consensus of some sort, even though there is little 
consensus. However, Padgett does seem to think that there is some sort 
of academic consensus about the methods of academic history, and that 
it appeals to psychosocial explanations, not theological ones. If the resur-
rection did take place it is beyond historical explanation. It would seem 
to follow that academic history is unable to account for some past events. 
Christian historians cannot base their faith on the probable arguments of 
history, but they can seek historical, public evidence for their beliefs. Faith 
must therefore be open to revision in the light of evidence and argument. 
Padgett appeals to Basil Mitchell's view that fideism is unsatisfactory and 
that there is a proper place for reflection and revision in the life of faith. 
If all the best historical evidence were against the resurrection then this 
would require a serious reinterpretation of Christian faith, though per-
haps not total abandonment of it. 
Next, Padgett argues that the natural sciences are not purely objective 
and are properly influenced by world views, not least by ethical norms 
controlling what is done. Theology has different methods to science, mak-
ing use of spiritual insight, revelation, religious traditions and communal 
worship, but it does seek truth. Padgett argues that methodological natu-
ralism too easily becomes metaphysical naturalism. However, there is a 
long tradition of natural philosophy that confined its attention to second-
ary as opposed to primary causes. He proposes that science is the rigorous 
and empirical investigation of secondary causes. This seems questionable, since 
angels, for example, are secondary causes but would not normally be con-
sidered appropriate matter for scientific study. Padgett suggests that ma-
terialists could consider the primary cause to be the universe or the laws 
of nature, but this seems to suggest that either science doesn't study the 
universe or the laws of nature or that they are both primary and second-
ary causes. In response to Del Ratzsch's claims that science has no clear 
definition and that it should pursue the truth rather than exclude plau-
sible explanations on the basis of artificial disciplinary divisions, Padgett 
responds that there are well-defined traditions of inquiry in which scien-
tists are trained and, although scientists should pursue truth as they see it, 
this may lead them beyond their own academic expertise and tradition of 
inquiry. The mutuality model involves real distinctions among academic 
disciplines but not strict separation. 
Padgett rejects rationalism in Christian theology; it should look to scrip-
ture and traditional norms before it looks to reason, philosophy and sci-
ence. Contra process theology; Whitehead's metaphysical system cannot 
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demand primacy. All philosophical systems so far have proved inadequate, 
our access to reality is limited and absolute systems tend to be imposed on 
others. The Christian theologian should draw piecemeal on philosophical 
notions, as best suits the goal of advancing Gospel truth. Though there 
is diversity in scripture, Christ provides the center of a consonant tradi-
tion and a responsible hermeneutic can guide and shape the community 
of faith. It may not be possible to provide compelling arguments for the 
scriphlral tradition, but natural theology has similar limitations. 
Theology ought to be a form of worship, addressing God, the people 
of God and finally all people interested in Christianity. In contrast with 
mere religious shldies and sociology, theology is interested in the truth 
about ultimate reality, not just in people's beliefs about it, and arises from 
love for God. This is compatible with the pursuit of truth, free from ideo-
logical or political interference, but the Enlightenment myth of value-free, 
universal rationality must be rejected, having failed on its own terms. As 
argued in an appendix, Padgett believes there are no universal standards 
of good informal argument but there are "family resemblances" amongst 
various traditions of inquiry. Christian theology can be an academic disci-
pline because it seeks to pursue truth in a rational, rigorous manner, but 
its notions of rationality ought not to be dictated from the outside. 
Padgett then offers some case studies where scientific and theological 
beliefs may mutually interact. Chapter seven looks at time, arguing that 
theological beliefs about the importance of history can inform the inter-
pretation of modern physics. Irreversible processes, such as the increase 
of entropy, should be seen as ontologically fundamental. The Christian 
doctrine of creation does not require that the universe began in time, but 
thermodynamics suggests that the universe will end. Padgett argues brief-
ly that this implies that physical time has a beginning, since otherwise we 
should already have reached the end. However, he seems to move too 
quickly from the universe having a finite future to it having a finite dura-
tion overall. Those familiar with debates about the Kalam cosmological 
argument will be unsatisfied, but Padgett merely concludes that science 
supports the contingency of the universe, which even those unpersuaded 
by his arguments may agree with. 
Chapter eight argues that history can influence Christology. It steers 
between Barth's reliance on revelation alone and Pannenberg's attempt to 
base faith on history. Belief in the incarnation demands historical study 
without being determined by it. Some doctrines go beyond the results of 
critical history, though they remain sensitive to it. Interestingly, Padgett 
thinks that historical evidence favors an orthodox understanding of the 
incarnation over Ebionitism, in which Jesus is a mere man, but not Arian-
ism, in which he is a pre-existent creature. Part of his case is that the early 
followers of Jesus worshipped him, although they were monotheists, but 
this seems a problem for Arianism as well as Ebionitism. 
This is a complex book full of eclectic scholarship. The image of an over-
arching worldview informed by and informing dialectic amongst distinct 
academic disciplines seems helpful, and, if it leaves it unclear exactly what 
properly belongs to each discipline, then this unclarity at least models re-
ality. The main weakness of the book is its lack of attention to specific dif-
ficulties. In his conclusion Padgett explains that he thought it more impor-
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tant to offer a broad outline of how we should approach the relationship 
of science and religion than to tackle the emotion-laden topic of evolution. 
However, the book contains too little discussion of questions of incompat-
ibility between scriptural and scientific accounts to make it clear how one 
should proceed on this problematic topic, or others. Padgett's case study 
of thermodynamics deals with a highly abstract doctrine of creation, rath-
er than the Biblical text, and his studies of resurrection and incarnation 
are atypical, in that the scriptural text is also the primary historical data. It 
might have been more useful to doubters inside and outside the commu-
nity of faith to pay more attention to disagreements and antitheses in the 
dialectic. In this regard the second book provides an interesting contrast. 
Like Padgett, Nicholas Saunders believes that science and theology 
should mutually inform each other, but his focus is far less constructive. 
Saunders offers a wide-ranging, scientifically astute, largely negative 
review of recent attempts to understand divine action in the light of mod-
ern science. He begins by noting how contemporary and biblical Christian 
practice suggests that God can control such things as the casting of lots 
(though concrete examples rarely figure later in the book). Ancient Near 
Eastern understandings of nature were far more personalized than mod-
ern ones, natural events being seen as the results of divine activity rather 
than autonomous causes. Today, theologians are thus faced with the ques-
tion of how very different concepts of nature can be fused in an intellectu-
ally defensible account. 
Special divine action (SDA), God's producing particular events, might 
be subsumed into the general act of creating and sustaining the universe, 
as in the theologies of Maurice Wiles and Gordon Kaufman. Saunders 
argues that such accounts are untraditional and not generally compel-
ling. Alternatively, all natural events might be seen as in some sense SDA. 
Saunders criticizes this approach for granting insufficient autonomy to 
the natural world. It raises problems for theodicy and for distinguishing 
significant divine actions from others. Austin Farrar's claim that God's 
action is hidden beyond human investigation is rejected as pessimistic 
and obscurantist. Accounts of the world as God's body are deemed un-
helpful and God's affecting mental processes does not avoid the problem 
of his interaction with physical systems, because the brain is involved. 
Saunders then distinguishes compatibilist SDA, which does not require 
God to initiate specific causal sequences which otherwise would not ex-
ist and which is compatible with physical determinism, from incompati-
bilist SDA, where God originates novel causal chains incompatible with 
physical determinism. Compatibilist accounts threaten to leave God unre-
sponsive or impotent, but incompatibilist accounts seem to require some 
sort of miraculous intervention or causal openness in the laws of nature. 
Many are wary of miraculous intervention, believing it suggests that God 
is somehow inconsistent or unfaithful to creation by acting against nature. 
Saunders discusses the concepts of laws of nature and determinism and 
concludes that the concept of intervention or violation only makes sense 
given a necessitarian account of the laws of nature, where laws are based 
on natural necessities. He claims that the other (regularitarian, instrumen-
talist, and irreducibly stochastic) accounts of laws of nature leave no scope 
for violations. If the laws describe events, as in a regularitarian account, 
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then they must be adjusted to cover unusual events, leaving no room for 
violation and making scientific prediction harder. 
Saunders adopts William James's account of determinism in which 
"those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and de-
cree what the other parts shall be" (p. 85). This ontological notion is distin-
guished from the epistemological one of predictability. Having outlined 
the conceptual landscape, Saunders then reviews attempts to combine 
quantum theory and chaos theory with divine action. The classic of this 
kind is William Pollard's Chance and Providence (London: Faber and Faber, 
1958), and contemporary theologians such as Robert Russell, Nancey Mur-
phy, and Thomas Tracy have also offered accounts of divine action utiliz-
ing quantum mechanics (e.g., the essays collected in Quantum Mechanics: 
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Philip Clay-
ton, Kirk Wegter-McNelly, John Polkinghorne [Vatican Observatory Publi-
cations and Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2001]). 
Saunders argues that such theories require a disputable, indeterministic 
interpretation of measurement events. Though he does not make this clear, 
proponents of quantum SDA usually concur, claiming that God can deter-
mine the outcome of these measurement events. Saunders characterizes 
this as lithe assertion that God simply 'ignores' the probabilities predicted 
by the orthodox measurement theory and controls the outcomes of par-
ticular measurements" (p. 154). Saunders complains that if God were thus 
to determine quantum events, then the probability patterns arising from 
quantum theory "either are a deception in that they have no relationship 
with physical reality whatsoever, or they are a representation of the chance 
of God acting in the same way on a subsequent occasion." (p. 155). 
Saunders sees the spectre of occasionalism lurking here and further 
argues that if we treat quantum-measurement probabilities as reflecting 
regularities in divine action, this commits us to a neo-Humean, "regu-
laritarian" conception of natural laws. Saunders has argued that such 
an account leaves no scope for violation, and therefore the very distinc-
tion between interventionist and non-interventionist divine action col-
lapses. Though Saunders does not say this, it would seem he should 
hold that any indeterministic law of nature leaves no scope for non-
interventionistic SDA, for similar arguments would apply. However, his 
arguments seem inconclusive. 
First, God need not ignore the probabilities predicted by measurement 
theory; God could determine the outcome of specific measurement events 
with reference to the overall frequencies predicted by orthodox measure-
ment theories. The claim that God ultimately determines the outcome of 
measurement events certainly raises questions about the autonomy of 
natural causes, but Scripture itself poses such questions. God's determina-
tions need not be understood in an occasionalistic fashion, but could take 
into account the nature of quantum reality; actualize its potentials and 
work through its powers. Saunders gives little attention to questions of 
primary and secondary causation, traditional doctrines of divine concur-
rence with created causes, and whether theologians must accept modem 
conceptions of nature's autonomy. 
Second, Saunders's discussion of natural laws is unconvincing. For ex-
ample, it is not clear why one's interpretation of measurement probabilities 
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must be the same as one's interpretation of other laws, or why even a regu-
laritarian view must make it meaningless to speak of violations of natural 
law (understood, in the spirit of Hume, as exceptions to the regular patterns 
of constant conjunction usually observed?). Paradoxically, Saunders's inter-
pretation of regularitarianism forces it to include blatant irregularities. 
Overall, Saunders's conclusion that "non-interventionist quantum SDA 
is not theoretically possible" (p. 172) seems hasty, but his discussion raises 
important issues. There are profound questions about the interpretation 
of quantum mechanics in general and about measurement and wavefunc-
tion collapse in the Copenhagen interpretation in particular. Furthermore, 
it is not clear that quantum measurement events affect macrosopic events 
in the world in the way that is required. Such scientific issues are in ad-
dition to the questions of theodicy and the relation of divine and created 
causality that arise in connection with any theory of SDA. 
Saunders next examines John Polkinghorne's attempts to use chaos the-
ory in a possible account of divine action. It is now widely realized that 
the equations describing the behavior of weather systems, for example, 
allow for vanishingly small differences to be rapidly magnified, so that 
their detailed behavior is impossible to predict in the longer term. Polk-
inghorne holds that the unpredictability of nature suggests that the world 
is more supple, flexible, and sensitively interrelated than physical theory 
can yet capture. Further, chaos theory allows that energy differences be-
tween different trajectories can tend to zero, so that God could control 
trajectories by "active information input" that need not violate the law of 
conservation of energy. Saunders notes that many critics of Polkinghorne 
complain that chaos theory involves deterministic equations, while miss-
ing the point that Polkinghorne argues that this is just an approximation 
to a more mysterious, indeterministic reality. Saunders goes on to show, 
however, that Polkinghorne's account of divine action utilizes aspects of 
chaos theory that rely on deterministic mathematics: "active information 
input relies again on the determinism of mathematical chaos to produce 
the required fractal structure in attractors, the required infinite limit of 
that structure, and the corresponding region in which energy differences 
between alternative possible trajectories tends to zero" (p. 194). It might 
be possible for Polkinghorne to respond that if deterministic chaos theory 
allows for control without energy input then a fortiori indeterministic real-
ity allows for it, but there are certainly serious questions about how far his 
theory is really supported by chaos theory. 
Saunders concludes that the prospects for supporting anything like tra-
ditional understandings of divine activity look extremely bleak and that 
theology is in crisis. As argued above, such a conclusion seems hasty. Sci-
ence lacks a coherent integration of quantum theory, chaos theory and 
general relativity, but the present picture still seems more congenial to 
non-interventionistic SDA than the classical Newtonian one. However, I 
agree with Saunders that theologians should increase their efforts to put 
forward scientifically and philosophically informed theories addressing 
the issues he raises. Overall, while Padgett might reasonably have paid 
more attention to apparent problems and Saunders might reasonably 
have not seen them as so serious, both books provide a valuable contribu-
tion to this important field. 
